We compare the compensation of CEOs of private firms that go public or sell out via acquisition with CEO compensation of standalone firms that remain private. We find that CEOs of IPO and sellout firms have higher compensation than CEOs of firms that remain private. We also show that equity-based compensation is positively related to the likelihood of going public. Although both IPO and sellout firms have higher option-based compensation in the year prior to the event, it is more dominant in firms that go public. We also document a positive relation between CEO cash and equity-based compensation and the valuation of the firm at the time of the acquisition or IPO.
Introduction
Both CEO compensation and the structure of CEO compensation play many important roles which, among others, include payment for CEO's effort and providing incentives to align CEO's interests with those of shareholders. While there is vast literature on compensation of public firms' CEOs, relatively little is known how private firms' CEOs are paid. We analyze CEO compensation at the time when the owners decide to sell the private firm. To the extent that the efforts and careers of CEOs are affected by the sale of the private firms, it is reasonable to expect that some incentives should be put in place prior to the decision to sell. We seek to answer the question of whether the compensation of private firms' CEO is structured efficiently and in a manner consistent with economic theory. Specifically, we explore how both the level and the structure of CEO compensation vary among private firms that go public, get acquired, or remain private. We further provide evidence on whether CEO compensation is related to the valuation of firms at the time they are either acquired or go public.
There are several reasons why compensation might be different for private firms that are selling out or go public. First, sale of the firm-whether to an acquirer or to the public in an IPO-is time consuming and requires additional effort by the CEO. For example, Bengtsson and Hand (2010) report that CEOs in private venture-capital backed firms must "put in significant effort to… facilitate the due-diligence process, and negotiate deal terms" (p. 6). Second, the sale of the firm leads to a change in control which directly affects the CEO of the selling firm.
Therefore, incentives might be put in place to offset the risk to the CEO which stems from this change of control. As Poulsen and Stegemoller (2008) point out, for a CEO an acquisition might be less attractive than an IPO because the likelihood that the target firm CEO may lose control is higher than is the case in an IPO. Hence, incentives provided to CEOs of acquired firms are likely to be different from incentives provided to CEOs of firms going public. Finally, after the IPO, firms have a liquid market for their shares, making it easier for the CEOs to sell their shares following lockup expiration (Aggarwal, Krigman, and Womack, 2002) . Similarly, an acquisition allows CEO to cash out of its illiquid option and stock holdings, since the stock and options become vested upon a change in control, allowing the CEO to exercise his options and to sell the stock in the acquisition (Cai and Vijh, 2007) . Therefore, in anticipation of the IPO or the acquisition, stock and option grants are a cost-effective way to compensate the CEO while simultaneously aligning his interests with the interests of the shareholders. Hence, first, if private firms' CEOs' compensation is set efficiently in anticipation of the outcomes, we expect that CEO compensation of IPO and sellout firms is characterized by higher equity-based component.
Second, as a result of varying level of change in control, we propose that the structure of CEO compensation varies between sellout and IPO firms. Finally, we expect that higher equity-based compensation is associated with higher valuation at the time of the sale of the private firm.
We use a sample of 5,524 private firm-years spanning the 2002-2011 period. During this period, we identify 212 private firms that are successfully acquired and 886 private firms that go public over the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] . Overall, our results show that private firms that become acquisition targets or pursue IPOs pay their CEOs differently than firms that remain private.
Specifically, we find that, compared to firms that remain private, total CEO compensation for acquired and IPO firms is greater in the year immediately prior to the event. In addition, acquired and IPO firms also offer their CEOs more incentive compensation. Both IPO and acquired firms have higher bonus and restricted stock grants in the year prior to the takeover than firms that remain private. We also find that CEOs of IPO firms receive more option compensation in the year prior to listing. Our conclusions are not affected by the choice of an econometric model and are robust to controlling for potential endogeneity issues. Our findings are also robust to controlling for other firm-specific characteristics that are related to the decision to get acquired, go public, or remain private. Specifically, we note that when compared to firms that remain private, acquired and IPO firms are larger, have more cash, and have higher capital expenditures.
Furthermore, firms that go public have higher profitability, lower debt, and higher capital expenditures than those that are acquired. Consistent with other research, we find that firms with venture capital backing are more likely to sell, especially through IPOs (Giot and Schweinbacher, 2007) . With respect to valuation of private firms at the time of the sale, we find that, on average, both cash and equity-based compensation are positively related to the valuation. This result is stronger for IPO firms. Overall, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the compensation of private firms' CEOs is efficient in that its structure reflects the expected effort related to selling the firm and aligns the interests of CEOs with interests of shareholders.
Our work complements the research on compensation in targets prior to takeovers of publicly traded firms (Cai and Vijh, 2005) by studying private firms. While little research has been done on private firm compensation, one recent study shows that the compensation of public and private firms does differ (Gao, Li, and Lemmon, 2012) . Specifically, Gao et al. (2012) show that, compared to public firms' CEOs, CEOs of private firms are paid less, get less equity-based compensation, and the pay-performance link is weaker. In our study, we focus on a unique set of outcomes, sellout and IPO, and analyze whether the private firms' CEOs compensation is set efficiently in anticipation of these outcomes. Another strand of literature to which our research is related examines factors that affect the choice of accessing public markets. Brau, Francis, and Kohers (2003) examine market and industry characteristics affecting the mode of sellout and find that takeovers of private targets by publicly traded firms are more likely in higher market-to-book and more leveraged industries. Our work is closely related to Poulsen and Stegemoller (2008) who examine the characteristics of private firms that access public equity markets either via acquisition by a public acquirer or through an IPO. They find that IPOs are preferred when the firm has greater growth opportunities, whereas acquisitions are preferred when managers are liquidating the firm and when the firm faces financial constraints. Since we consider firms that sell by any means, not just those that attempt to access public equity markets, our sample is more diverse than samples studied in prior literature. In addition, our sample includes private firms that remain private and builds on existing literature by examining another covariate of the decision to sell a private firm-CEO compensation, a topic which has not been previously studied.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we describe the data used in our study and provide univariate comparisons. In Section 3 we present empirical findings based on multivariate analysis. Section 4 concludes.
Data and sample characteristics
Our data is from Capital IQ (CIQ), an affiliate of Standard and Poor's, which has CEO compensation data comparable in detail to that of ExecuComp (also an affiliate of Standard and Poor's). firms as firms that neither get acquired nor go public in a particular year. We first identify the sample of firms that get acquired or go public using CIQ's event data. We collect additional details about the IPO from SDC. We identify a sample of 212 acquired firms, 886 IPO firms, and 4,426 control firm-year observations. From this sample 1,517 firms have 1 year of data, 683 have 2 years of data, and 575 have 3 or more years of data, for an average of two years per firm.
The time series distribution of the sample of acquired, IPO, and control firms is shown in Acquisitions also show a declining trend over the sample period. We note that the number of firms that remain private declines towards the end of the period as well. With respect to the compensation structure of the CEO, we analyze total compensation as well as its components. Specifically, we collect information on salary, bonus, value of restricted stock grants ("RSGs") and of option grants. 5 We scale each of the components by the total compensation. Total compensation includes salary, bonus, value of option grant, RSG value, and 3 http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/IPOs2011Statistics70512.pdf 4 Our conclusions are robust to excluding financial firms from our analyses. 5 To measure the value of option compensation for these private firms, we calculate the Black-Scholes value of the option following Gao, Lemmon and Li (2012) who use the median volatility of public firms in the same two-digit industry, the 7-year Treasury as the risk-free rate, the exercise price as the grant date price, the dividend yield paid out to the exercise price, and the time to maturity of 7 years.
other compensation. We also calculate a cash compensation ratio as salary plus bonus. Similarly, we define equity-based compensation as the sum of the value of RSG and option grants. With respect to operating performance, we calculate ROA as the ratio of net income to total assets. The results in Table 2 show that IPO firms have the highest ROA, with a mean of -0.23 for IPOs and -0.97 for acquired firms. The large negative ROAs are a result of the fact that a non-trivial number of firms report large cumulative losses and as a result have negative equity. We therefore split our samples based on whether the total equity is positive or negative.
A total of 73% of the private firms, 68% of the acquired sample, and 83% of the IPO firms have positive equity; the average ROA for these firms is a more reasonable -0.15, -0.14, and -0.09, respectively. Based on the results, it is clear that the denominator for the ROA is on average very small relative to the numerator for the firms with negative equity. We use an indicator variable to account for these negative equity firms in multivariate analysis. It is important to note that our sample includes the recent financial crisis which likely explains why, on average, the operating performance is negative. Overall, our sample has similar characteristics to the sample used by Gao et al. (2012), although we find a greater number of firms with negative equity. This is likely because we include the post-2007 crisis years in our sample, while Gao et al. (2012) 
Multivariate analyses

Outcomes for private firms
The univariate results suggests that compensation is significantly greater for CEOs of firms that get acquired than CEOs of firms that go public or CEOs of firms that remain private.
However, acquired firms are also larger than IPO firms and differ in other ways, which makes a univariate analysis of the relation between the CEO compensation structure and exit outcomes difficult to interpret. Hence, we examine how differences in CEO compensation level and structure affect outcomes for firms in a multivariate setting.
We begin by estimating a logistic regression model with the dependent variable equal to one if the private firm becomes a takeover target or goes public and zero if it remains private in a particular year. In all models, we control for firm size since Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) report that IPOs are more likely to be larger firms with higher valuations. Conversely, both Palepu (1986) and Powell (1997) argue that transaction costs of acquisitions increase with firm size so acquisition targets tend to be smaller firms. Following Poulsen and Stegemoller (2008) who show that firms with higher capital expenditures are significantly more likely to perform an IPO as are firms that receive venture capital backing, we control for both characteristics in our estimations. A number of empirical studies have examined whether the likelihood of becoming a target is decreasing or increasing in the profitability of a firm with differing results (Palepu, 1986; Dickerson, Gibson and Tsakalotos, 2002) . Pagano (1995) suggests that companies may show temporarily high performance immediately before an IPO with the hope that investors will think the profitability is permanent. As discussed previously, we use ROA to control for a firm's performance. Highly leveraged companies face stronger borrowing constraints, which may motivate the need to go public or be acquired, hence, we control for the total debt to assets (Perevozchikov, 2010) . Harford (2005), Hsieh, Lyandres, and Zhdanov (2011), and Kummer and
Steger (2008) suggest that IPOs and acquisitions come in waves. We therefore control for the contemporaneous market conditions using the average industry market-to-book and the number of IPOs and takeovers in the industry. We define industry at the two-digit SIC code level. We also include an indicator variable which equals one if the firm has negative equity and zero otherwise. The independent variables are measured in the year preceding the outcome (Cavender et al., 1992) . We include industry and year fixed effects in all regressions.
We estimate a logistic model where the dependent variable equals one if the firm is sold (goes public or is acquired) and zero if it remains private. In Table 4 , Panel A regressions (1) through (3) present results for the full sample. The coefficient on total compensation in regression (1) indicates that CEOs of selling firms have higher compensation than those that remain private, even after controlling for other firm characteristics. The coefficient is significant at the one percent level. The positive and significant coefficient on equity-based compensation in regression (2) shows that CEOs of selling firms receive higher equity-based compensation.
Bonus and restricted stock is greater for these firms, while salary makes up a lower fraction of total compensation and is insignificant. Thus, incentive-based compensation is greater in firms that sell than those that remain private. Because the majority of the existing research focuses on
IPOs to major US exchanges rather than the OTC market, regressions (4) through (6) report the same specifications but exclude OTC firms. Our conclusions are not affected. Overall, based on results in Table 4 , we conclude that CEOs of sellout and IPO firms have a compensation structure that is different from the compensation structure of CEOs of firms that remain private.
The results are consistent with the view that the CEO compensation is structured to compensate for the higher effort by the CEO due to the sale of the firm and to align CEO's interests with the interests of the shareholders. Specifically, CEOs of sell-out and IPO firms have higher equity-based compensation than CEOs of firms that remain private.
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With respect to the control variables, selling firms are larger and have more cash and have higher capital expenditures than firms that remain private. The negative coefficient on negative equity indicator suggests that firms with large cumulative losses are less likely to be sold. Not surprisingly, venture capital backing is significantly and positively related to the likelihood being sold in all regressions.
The logistic regression in Table 4 distinguishes between two results: sale of a firm versus remaining private. Since in our sample we observe three outcomes, we next estimate a multinomial logistic model to separate the forms of outcomes into firms that are acquired, go public, or remain private. The results are presented in Table 5 for the full sample. Acquired and IPO firms have higher total compensation relative to firms that stay private. The significance of the result is related to CEOs of both sellout and IPO firms having higher equity-based compensation (regressions (3) and (4)). The coefficients of equity-based compensation for the sellout and IPO firms are significant at the ten and five percent level, respectively. Interestingly, firms that are acquired have higher bonus and option compensation than those that stay private.
IPO firms also have higher bonus and option compensation, but also have higher RSG grants in the year prior to going public. The results showing higher bonus pay for sellout and IPO firms is consistent with Bengtsson and Hand (2010) who find that CEOs are rewarded for their efforts in raising new equity capital for the firm. Overall, the importance of equity-based compensation for
CEOs of acquired and IPO firms is robust to alternative modeling specification.
With respect to the control variables, size is again positively related to the likelihood of being acquired or going public. Firms with higher profitability, lower debt ratios, higher cash and capital expenditures, are more likely to go public than remain private. IPO firms are also less likely to have negative equity than those that stay private. Thus, firms that go public are healthier than firms that remain private, while acquired firms are more comparable to those firms that remain private. Consistent with other research, we find that firms backed by VCs are more likely to go public.
In Panel B of (2003) and Poulsen and Stegemoller (2008) . Overall, when we exclude firms going public on OTC exchange from our sample, the conclusions regarding CEO compensation structure are not affected.
Outcomes for private firms: Robustness tests
The logistic and multinomial logistic regression analyses performed in Tables 4 and 5 do not take into account that private firms that neither sell out nor go public by the end of our sample, retain the option to later go public or be acquired. We address this issue by estimating a hazard model analyzing the determinants of whether a firm experiences one of the two outcomes or not. A hazard model assesses the conditional probability of an event, in our case the event is either an acquisition or an IPO, given that the event has not occurred up to the present time (i.e. the hazard rate). We estimate the hazard model on a panel dataset for all firms for which we are able to identify the necessary founding dates. The independent variables used in the hazard models are consistent with variables used in the logistic regressions. In additional robustness tests, we attempt to address the issue of endogeneity, which affects much of corporate finance research, by using an instrumental variable approach and propensity score matching. 7 We follow Li and Prabhala (2007) instrumental variable approach and use information on compensation of CEOs in public firms from CIQ to estimate the "predicted" equity-based and cash compensation for CEOs in our sample of private firms.
Specifically, we calculate the average equity and cash compensation for all firms in a particular industry in CIQ. We then use the average equity and cash compensation of the industry peers in a particular year in lieu of the actual compensation of the CEO of the private firm in our sample.
This instrumental variable is free of the potential firm-level endogeneity concern and captures industry effects on CEO compensation Table 7 reports the results of multinomial logistic regressions using the instrumental variables. We note that, similar to results in Table 5 , cash compensation has consistently positive coefficient; however, none of the coefficients is statistically significant. Equity-based compensation enters with positive coefficient that is significant in three out of four regressions. In untabulated results, we note that the results are statistically stronger for specifications including only firms going public on major exchanges.
We also use propensity score matching to further examine the effect of potential endogeneity on our result. We identify one matched firm for each treatment (acquired or IPO)
firm by estimating finding the closest match in terms of the propensity score which is based on ROA, size, VC backing, and industry. We allow for matching with replacement, i.e. a non-treatment (no outcome) firm may be matched to more than one treatment firm. Overall, our prior conclusions are robust to alternative econometric modeling approach and also appear robust to endogeneity issues.
Valuation at the time of the sale
If the type and amount of compensation that CEOs receive before selling the firm is related to the effort involved with the process and to the alignment of CEOs' interests with those of the shareholders, then the compensation structure should also be related to the payoff received by the shareholders of the selling firm. We therefore analyze the valuations of selling firms and how such valuations are related to CEO compensation structure. The univariate results in Table 3 show that IPO firms have higher valuation multiples. In this section we analyze the result in multivariate setting and assess the relation between the CEO compensation structure and the valuations at the time of the IPO or the acquisition.
We estimate an OLS regression models with the dependent variable equal to the log of one plus the valuation multiple. 8 In order to make sure that our results are not driven by outliers, we also winsorize the valuation multiples at the 0.5% and 99.5%. We exclude IPO firms for which the IPO price of the common shares is not available. In all regressions, we include an indicator equal to one if a firm undertakes an IPO and to zero if it gets acquired. Our regression models follow our prior specifications. In particular, we control for firm size by using log of revenue, operating performance, capital structure, cash holdings, capital expenditures, industry market conditions by using industry average market-to-book ratio and the number of IPOs and takeovers. We also include an indicator variable which equals one if the firm has negative equity and zero otherwise. As before, each of these variables is measured in the year immediately preceding the event year. All regressions include year and industry indicators and use heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors.
The first two regressions of Table 9 report the results for the pooled sample of acquired and IPO firms. In regression (1), the coefficient on the IPO sales indicator is positive and significant at the ten percent level. The size of the coefficient implies that IPO firms have multiples that are higher by about 8.4% compared to valuation of acquired private firms. 9 Higher valuation is also associated with higher cash and equity-based CEO compensation. Regression (2) indicates that the significance of the cash compensation is driven by both salary and bonus and the significance of equity-based compensation is driven by option compensation. The IPO indicator is no longer significant in regression (2), suggesting that the valuation differences between IPO and sellout firms are explained by the varying CEO compensation structure.
Because compensation may affect firms that sellout differently than firms that go public we analyze acquisition and IPO samples separately and report the results in columns (3) through (6). The coefficients on cash and equity-based compensation are each insignificant in the sample of acquired firms. In contrast, both cash and equity-based compensation is positively associated 9 e 0.081 -1 = 8.4%.
with valuation in the IPO sample, and is driven by salary and options. These coefficients are also different between the two sub-samples at the one percent level. In regressions (7) through (10), we re-estimate regressions (3) through (6) on samples excluding firms with negative equity. In this sub-sample the effect of the presence of negative equity firms becomes apparent as compensation becomes positive and significant in the acquisition sample. We continue to find that compensation has a stronger effect on valuation of IPO firms. With respect to control variables, firms with lower ROA, higher cash holdings and capital expenditures, and firms with negative equity have higher valuations. Exiting firms with VC backing, at a time of low IPO activity, in industries with high market-to-book ratios have significantly higher valuations.
In general, these results indicate that higher CEO salary and option compensation of IPO firms is associated with higher shareholder value at the time of the sale. Comparable results hold only for acquired firms with positive equity. Overall, we find that CEO compensation is not only related with the decision to sell and the mode of the sale, but is also related with the valuation of the selling firms.
Conclusion
At some point in the life of a private company, the owners may consider a sale of the firm. The choices available to the owners include taking the company public through an IPO or selling the company to an interested acquirer. Both the IPO and the acquisition process require additional time and effort on behalf of CEOs. Providing the CEOs with more equity and option compensation provides executives with additional incentives to pursue a sale of the firm.
We find higher equity-based compensation in the year prior to a private firm's sale as compared to firms that remain private, consistent with both the sellout and IPO firms offering CEOs compensation for higher effort due to the sale of the firm and aligning their interests with those of the shareholders. While both IPO and acquired firms grant their CEOs more options than is the case for private firms, options grants are more prevalent at firms going public than they are at firms getting acquired. With respect to firm characteristics, we also find that firms that go public exhibit better performance. Consistent with other research, we find that firms with venture capital backing are more likely to sell, especially through IPOs. Finally, we note that sales valuations are positively related to CEO compensation structure for selling firms. Overall, our findings suggest that the board of directors structures the compensation of private firms CEOs efficiently-the compensation structure is designed to offset the additional efforts required and the costs to the CEO due to the ensuing change in control. Salary/Total, Bonus/Total, Option/Total and RSG/Total are the ratios of the various compensation components adjusted by total compensation. Panel B shows the firm-specific variables. Revenue is the total reported revenue, Total Assets is the total assets. Net Income is the reported net income and Total Cash is the total reported cash and equivalents. Leverage and Total Cash/Total Assets are the ratio of total debt (cash) to total assets. CapEx/Total Assets is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. ROA are the ratio of net income divided by total equity and total assets respectively. Test of Difference in Means reports the two-tailed tests of whether the means are significantly different between each of the three samples. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Test of Difference in Means:
Test Table 4 shows the logit estimation where the dependent variable is equal to one if there is an IPO or acquisition and zero otherwise. Columns 4-6 do not include OTC IPOs. We control for year and industry fixed effects. Tables 2 and 3 describe the independent variables. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. We use a robust estimation and report p-values below the coefficients. (1) (2) (3) Table 6 reports the results of hazard model estimating the probability of sale conditional on the sale not occuring prior to time T. All variables are defined in prior tables. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Table 7 shows unordered multinomial logit estimation where the dependent variable is IPO, acquisition, and no outcome. Regression (1) uses all firms in the sample. Regression (2) excludes the firms going public on OTC market. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects. All variables are defined in prior tables. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust estimation is used. p-values are reported below the coefficients. Table 9 shows the OLS estimation where the dependent variable is the log of one plus either the total consideration from the acquisition or the implied value of the firm at the IPO price each divided by total assets. Implied value of the firm at the IPO is estimated as the pre-IPO shares outstanding times the IPO price. Exit = IPO is an indicator variable that is one if the exit was an IPO and 0 if the exit was an acquisition. We control for year and industry fixed effects. The independent variables are desribed in prior tables. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust estimation is used. 
